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This article explores the relationship between international trade law, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and economic growth of developing countries. Here, I 
argue that a developing state needs to capture the right combination of the 
different types of FDI to promote domestic growth. I apply principles of law, 
economics, and finance to my analysis of the importance of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), compared to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to FDI inflow, 
and how it can impact economic growth in developing countries. I show that the 
RTAs give a signal that the country is open to foreign investment, and therefore 
it promotes FDI inflow more efficiently than BITs. Nevertheless, there are 
different levels of states’ commitment to free trade, and to the RTA signed, which 
does impact the kind of FDI received. I compare Brazil and Mexico’s FDI inflow 
and national regulatory governance to illustrate my theory. Finally, I propose 
that the goal of developing countries’ international trade policy should go further 
than just the promotion of FDI inflow. It should focus on promoting the right 
combination of the different types of FDI inflow that will promote long term 
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1. INTRODUCTION
International economic law scholars consider the relationship between
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) an important empirical question.1 Many studies have 
ventured into the exercise of statistical analysis to answer this question 
without achieving a final consistent theory.2 I believe that the answer to this 
question is not relevant; I may venture to say that “do BITs work?” is not the 
important question. BITs do present a cost to the countries signing them, 
which should be offset by the increase in the inflow of FDI. I do agree that 
FDI does promote economic growth, but I believe that we should better 
qualify the question by asking “what type of FDI” or “what combination” 
brings the most benefits to developing countries. 
The current assumption is that BITs promote protections for foreign 
investors, therefore creating an incentive for investments in the developing 
country that is party to the BIT. But after some research, I found an indication 
that BITs may not deliver as promised, which moved me to identify other 
legal instruments that can promote FDI inflow. 
In this paper, I aim to assess the relationship between Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs), FDI inflow, and developing countries’ economic 
growth. I show here that RTAs are better instruments than BITs, as they 
impact domestic governance. In this study, I will compare Brazil and 
Mexico’s FDI inflow and national regulatory governance to illustrate my 
theory. Instead of focusing on BITs, I use RTAs, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA 
to identify how they impacted the domestic regulatory system of each country 
respectively and the influx of FDI. I also break FDI into horizontal and 
vertical investments and qualify it as greenfield or merger and acquisition 
(M&A) type.3 Applying these distinctions, I found theoretical evidence that 
for developing countries to achieve stable economic growth it requires not 
only the influx of FDI, but a balance between greenfield and M&A inflow. 
Next, I will discuss the literature and the foundational basis for my 
theory. In Part 3, I present the key characteristics of the different types of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and how each one impacts economic growth. 
In Part 4, I discuss Mexico’s motivations to conclude the NAFTA agreement, 
and how its commitment fit with Mexico’s economic policy at the time, and 
the importance of the USMCA (as a continuation of NAFTA) to Mexico’s 
economic growth. In Part 5, I discuss the MERCOSUR in more detail, review 
its more than twenty-five years of existence, and evaluate its impact on 
Brazil’s regulatory governance, the promotion of FDI inflow, and Brazil’s 
economic growth. Finally, in the conclusion, I emphasize the results from the 
 1 Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct 
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L. L. 397, 442 (2011). 
2 Id. at 405 (Prof. Yackee presents a review of the empirical literature). 
 3 In part 3, labeled Foreign Direct Investment, I explain each one of these qualifications 




adoption of trade liberalization policy versus promotion of domestic industry 
policy along with my final considerations and recommendations. 
2. THE FOUNDATIONS – A MULTIDISCIPLINARY OVERVIEW
Professor Yackee, applying three different tests, found that “BITs spur
investment only irregularly, inconsistently, and with generally unassuming 
impact.”4 Reviewing the literature on BITs, FDIs, and economic growth one 
can conclude that investors do not take BITs into consideration when 
assessing foreign investment opportunities,5 and that influx of FDI is not of 
major importance for the economic growth of developing countries when 
taken separately.6 
One such example is Brazil. The country is well recognized for its 
aversion to international arbitration mechanisms.7 The argument presented to 
justify such aversion alludes to the unfairness of privileging foreign investors 
to the detriment of domestic investors.8 To this effect, from 1994 to October 
2019 Brazil has signed 26 BITs, and only one is still in force.9 As of the 
writing of this paper, the only Brazilian BIT in force is the one signed with 
Angola in 2015.10 Under this BIT, there is no investor-state dispute resolution 
mechanism, just state-to-state arbitration. However, the arbitration can only 
be initiated after the disputing state brings the issue to a special committee 
but is not satisfied with the committee’s final recommendation.11 Even 
though Brazil does not have BITs, the country has been able to capture 
expressive FDI over the years, which is contrary to what would be expected 
4 Yackee, supra note 1, at 434. 
5 Yackee, supra note 1, at 414. 
6 Paul Krugman, International Finance and Economic Development, in FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 11 (Alberto Giovannini ed., 1993). Here, Krugman 
states that capital accumulation is not of major importance for economic growth and that there 
is no historical evidence that capital would flow from rich into poor countries due to financial 
liberalization. Id. at 14-22. Further in this paper, I will demonstrate that recent literature may 
offer a qualification to Krugman’s theory. 
     7 Paulo Cavallo, Brazil, BITs and FDI: A Synthetic Control Approach, Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 20 (2019) 68–97, at 75. Brazil has refused to sign the ICSID Convention, 
and as the Cavallo mentions, Brazil’s Congress had not ratified BITs because arbitration is 
seen as interfering with the country’s sovereignty. 
     8   Id. 
 9 International Investment Agreements Navigator – Brazil, UNCTAD, https:// 
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/27/brazil (last 
visited in Nov. 24, 2019). 
10 Id. 
11 Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos Entre o Governo da República 
Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República de Angola, Brazil-Angola, § IV art. 15, 2015, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/4720/download. This committee has equal representation from both states and is formed 
once a complaint is presented by one of the states. Id. at § II art. 4. However, the many steps 
that are set up before the arbitration can in fact make the arbitrage an unlikely occurrence. See 
id. at § IV art. 15. 
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if BITs are necessary to promote FDI inflow. Graphic 1 below shows Brazil’s 
FDI inflow from 1991 to 2017.12 From 1994 to 2000 there was an increase in 
FDI inflow, even though no BIT was in place. If not BITs, then what does 
promote FDI inflow? I propose that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are 
a better instrument than BITs to promote FDI inflow. 
This graphic also shows us that the inflow of foreign direct investment 
in Brazil was not stable, and the drops in investment were timed with 
economic crises and domestic political instability. From 2000 to 2003 Brazil 
experienced a monetary crisis and the uncertainty of the policies that would 
be implemented by the newly elected president, Mr. Lula da Silva.13 Then 
FDI inflow increased under the administration of President Lula, but it 
dropped almost halfway during the economic crisis in 2008, as graphic 1 
shows. Brazil experienced another substantial increase soon after, but it did 
not resist the political turmoil under allegations of corruption at the highest 
level of administration, which led to a presidential impeachment.14 
I believe that these spurs of growth followed by a deep decrease in the 
inflow of FDI, as seen in the graphic above, require further qualification to 
 12 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) – Brazil, THE WORLD BANK 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=BR (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019). 
 13 Mr. Lula da Silva is a member of the Labor Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), and was 
the first left-wing candidate ever elected in Brazil. 
 14 In April 2016, Ms. Dilma Rousseff was the second President of Brazil to be impeached. 
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my initial assumption. It is not only the existence of RTAs that matter, but 
specific characteristics within the RTAs. As I discuss below, the RTAs give 
a signal that the country is open to foreign investment, therefore, it promotes 
FDI inflow. Nevertheless, in this paper, I show that there are different levels 
of the state’s commitment to free trade, and to the RTA signed, which does 
impact the kind of FDI received. Finally, I propose that the goal of 
developing countries’ international trade policy should go further than just 
the promotion of FDI inflow. It should focus on the promotion of the right 
combination of the different types of FDI inflow that will promote long term 
investment and stable economic growth. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many countries that were traditionally 
closed to foreign investment started opening their markets due to the need for 
capital inflows.15 Brazil and Mexico were no exceptions; however, each 
country embraced a very different policy strategy. Mexico embraced trade 
liberalization16 and the jurisdiction of international law through investment 
arbitration mechanisms,17 whereas Brazil focused on state promotion of 
domestic industries,18 and avoided international arbitration mechanisms. 
Because MERCOSUR and NAFTA are the most important regional 
trade agreements signed by Brazil and Mexico respectively, I focus on the 
effects each agreement had on the national regulatory governance of each 
country, and how it impacted the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Brazil and Mexico. Graphic 2 below shows us the inflow of FDI in Brazil 
(blue line) and Mexico (orange line).19 Brazil has received a higher inflow of 
FDI overall; however, Mexico’s inflow of FDI was less affected than Brazil’s 
inflow during the periods of economic crisis. In this paper, I aim to explain 
the reason for this difference and its impact on the countries’ economic 
growth, considering the impact of MERCOSUR and NAFTA in each country 
respectively. 
     15 See generally DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE, (1st ed. 2009) [hereinafter GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS]. 
 16 Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World 
Trade Organizations: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT’L. L. 551, 551-632 
(2012). 
 17 Sergio Puig, NAFTA Authority and Political Behavior: The Case of Mexico, 5 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 363, 371-77 (2007). 
18 Santos, supra note 16. 
 19 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) – Brazil, Mexico, THE 
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=BR-
MX. (Last visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
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More than twenty-five years after both agreements entered into force, 
much has changed in the international and domestic scenario for both 
countries. MERCOSUR has not achieved the expected unification goal. On 
the other hand, NAFTA, although generally successful, has been renegotiated 
recently by its members. The new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) was signed by the members on November 30th, 2018. The 
USMCA entered into force and replace the NAFTA in June 2020.20 Although 
the USMCA presents a few and quite important changes to NAFTA, I will 
not discuss them here because my analysis focuses on the past impact of 
NAFTA. I do believe that USMCA requires further study to identify how it 
will impact Mexico’s FDI inflow, but it is not for this paper. For now, I 
appraise the impact of regulatory changes implemented by Brazil and Mexico 
under the influence of these RTAs and assess the impact of both agreements 
on FDI inflow in the respective countries. 
This study will better inform Brazilian and Mexican policymakers 
towards structuring new regulatory reforms that can best promote 
development. This topic is quite current as Brazil and Mexico have new 
Presidents, both elected on a platform that called for major changes from the 
 20 The USMCA is set to enter into force on June 1, 2020. The agreement was ratified by 
Mexico on June 19, 2019. The United States ratified it on January 29, 2020, after adding 
stronger labor provisions. It was finally ratified by Canada on March 13, 2020 without 
changes. A new Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, CANADA.CA, 
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ 
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economic policies of their previous governments. This paper also adds to the 
current literature as it presents a novel approach to the study of the 
relationship between FDIs, regulatory governance, and economic growth in 
developing countries. 
The recent economic and political crises Brazil has experienced offer an 
opportunity for re-evaluation of recent policies and regulations, leading to 
recommendations for deep and substantial reforms that can better support 
sustainable economic growth. Some of the reforms recommended and 
discussed in this paper are being currently addressed by the Brazilian 
President, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro.21 
Vast literature, especially in economics, has indicated the importance of 
law and legal institutions to economic growth, presenting empirical and 
theoretical evidence of the positive effect of credible legal rules and 
institutions in economic growth and FDI inflow.22 Globerman and Shapiro 
identified governance infrastructure as an important determinant of FDI 
inflow and outflow.23 Brunetti, Kisunko & Weder developed an indicator of 
the “credibility of rules” and ran a regression model, using 73 countries; the 
results showed significant association between credibility and cross-country 
differences in economic growth and investment.24 A Buchanan, Le, and Rishi 
study has shown a direct relationship between institutional quality and 
volatility of FDI.25 Furthermore, poor institutional quality increases volatility 
of FDI inflow and volatile inflow has negative influences on economic 
growth, as Lensink and Morrisey have found.26 
Historically, Brazil has embraced a less ambitious strategy on trade 
liberalization with shallow measures to open its market, maintaining its 
loyalty to the development of domestic industries in detriment of the 
liberalization of trade. Since then, the FDI pattern in Brazil has been volatile, 
generating spurts of economic growth followed by long periods of 
 21 I will discuss the current recommendations being addressed by the Brazilian 
government within the presentation of the recommendations in Part 4. 
 22 Fathi A. Ali, Norbert Fiess & Ronald MacDonald, Do Institutions Matter for Foreign 
Direct Investment?, 21 OPEN ECON. REV. 201, 201–19 (2010); Frank B. Cross, Law and 
Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2002). 
 23 Steven Globerman & Daniel Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The 
Role of Governance Infrastructure, 30 WORLD DEV. 1899 (2002). This article defines 
governance infrastructure as political, institutional and legal environment. 
 24 Aymo Brunetti, Gregory Kisunko, & Beatrice Weder, Credibility of Rules and 
Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector, 12 WORLD BANK 
ECON. REV. 353 (1998) (the indicators of credibility in this model are: predictability of rule-
making, subjective perception of political instability, security of persons and property, 
predictability of judicial enforcement, and corruption). 
 25 Bonnie G. Buchanan, Quan V. Le, & Meenakshi Rishi, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Institutional Quality: Some Empirical Evidence, 21 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 81 (2012). 
 26 Robert Lensink. & Oliver Morrissey, Foreign Direct Investment: Flows, Volatility and 
the Impact on Growth, 14 REV. INT’L ECON. 478 (2001). 
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recession.27 Brazil’s strategy requires a domestic entrepreneurial 
environment to promote economic growth.28 However, Brazil’s regulations 
and public policy do not foment a favorable business entrepreneurial 
environment.29 
On the other hand, Mexico has adopted a policy of trade liberalization, 
especially with its neighbor, the United States.30 With the exception of a few 
programs aiming to help small and medium size business as well as the export 
industry, Mexico dismantled most of its protectionist industrial policies.31 
Mexico’s regulatory reform was crowned with the conclusion of NAFTA, 
which bound the country’s commitment to market liberalization policy, even 
attaching to future government leadership. Leadership in Mexico changes 
every six years with Presidential elections, but since NAFTA the 
administrations prior to current President López Obrador32 maintained, and 
in recent years furthered, regulatory reform. The effect of NAFTA has been 
an increase in inward flow of FDI and a change in the investors’ perceptions 
of factors that determine FDI.33 One example of regulatory change is the 
reform on secured transactions laws based on the UNCITRAL Model Law,34 
and the changes to the Foreign Investment Law (1993) that relax the 
limitations imposed on the majority of capital flows, government approval 
requirements, and management control allowed to foreign investors.35 
Another positive impact credited to NAFTA are the improvements to the 
banking regulatory system.36 Although Mexico has promoted many legal 
reforms to support more globalized growth, it has not fulfilled all the 
 27 Thorsten Beck, Impediments to the Development and Efficiency of Financial 
Intermediation in Brazil, WORLD BANK FIN. SECTOR STRATEGY & POL’Y DEP’T (Policy 
Research Working Paper, June 2000); Inflação passa de 10% em 12 meses pela primeira vez 
desde 2003, VEJA (Dec. 9, 2015) http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/economia/inflacao-passa-de-
10-em-12-meses-pela-primeira-vez-desde-2003.
28 Buchanan et al., supra note 25, at 82.
29 Otaviano Canuto, Matheus Cavallari, & José Guilherme Reis, The Brazilian
Competitiveness Cliff, WORLD BANK ECON. PREMISE, (Feb. 2013). 
30 Santos, supra note 16, at 551. 
31 Santos, supra note 16; Andreas Waldkirch, The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in 
Mexico Since NAFTA, 33 WORLD ECON. 710 (2010) [hereinafter Waldkirch, Effects]. 
32 Although being elected on a protectionist platform, López Obrador’s administration 
has maintained the commitment through the renegotiations of NAFTA, which concluded with 
the creation of the USMCA that had already been ratified by Mexico. 
 33 Andreas Waldkirch, The ‘New Regionalism’ and Foreign Direct Investment: The Case 
of Mexico, 12 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV.151 (2003) [hereinafter Waldkirch, New 
Regionalism]. 
 34 Boris Kozolchyk & Cristina Castaneda, Invigorating Micro and Small Businesses 
Through Secured Commercial Credit in Latin America: The Need for Legal and Institutional 
Reform, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 43 (2011); Boris Kozolchyk, Secured Lending and Its 
Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 727 (2006). 
35 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31. 
 36 Ross Levine, International Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth, 9 REV. 




commitments under NAFTA, which may explain the initial timid impact of 
NAFTA.37 
Overall, it seems that the “take it or leave it”38 approach adopted by the 
United States during the negotiations of NAFTA positively influenced 
Mexico, encouraging regulatory changes. Nevertheless, like any other 
regional trade agreement, NAFTA has its shortcomings. The fact that Mexico 
took more than ten years to promote and implement the necessary regulatory 
changes and that Mexico has not yet improved in other important areas such 
as education and the protection of peasants against the effects of agricultural 
imports from the US attest to its shortcomings.39 Had Mexico implemented 
the necessary changes and reforms from day one, the country could be in a 
better economic position today. Yet, NAFTA is an example of an RTA with 
binding effect on future government leadership, which positively impacts 
how investors see Mexico because of this strong commitment effect. As a 
result, Mexico has captured more than double the amount of greenfield 
investment projects than Brazil, as data from 2005 to 2015 shows.40 
3. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)
According to my theory, developing countries should promote a
balanced inflow of different types of FDI. Policy makers should aim for a 
balance between investments that are seeking to access new markets 
(horizontal FDI) and others taking advantage of host country’s comparative 
advantage (vertical FDI). Before I can discuss how to promote inflow of the 
correct mix of FDI, I should explain here the different types of FDI. 
FDI can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal FDI is when a firm 
reproduces abroad the same business it operates domestically.41 In this case, 
trade and investment are substitutes as the operation of the business abroad 
     37 Alfredo Cuevas et al., Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico Since the Approval of 
NAFTA, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV, 482 (2005). When the authors applied their estimation 
to the Mexican data, they found that “factors not included in the regressions caused 
exceedingly slow growth of FDI inflows in Mexico in the late 1990s.”. 
 38 Eric Gillman, Legal Transplants in Trade and Investment Agreements: Understanding 
the Exportation of US Law to Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 300 (2009). In this paper, 
the authors emphasized the U.S.’s position when negotiating FTAs with Latin American 
countries as rigid and demanding of the commitment to regulatory changes. 
     39   GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 156. 
 40 Courtney Fingar, Mexico Foreign Direct Investment Races Ahead as Brazil Sputters, 




m&iab=barrier-app#axzz43Ol52vje. This article used data from the FDI Markets and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit for the period from 2005 to 2015. 
     41 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 719, 726. The author explains the main 
characteristics of vertical FDI (exploiting comparative advantage) and horizontal FDI (market 
seeking). 
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does not complement the domestic operation, therefore, the investors are 
looking for access to a new market.42 This is the type of investment mostly 
captured by Brazil because of its historically unchangeable implementation 
of an import substitution economic strategy.43 On the other hand, vertical FDI 
exploits comparative advantage as the investor identifies where the 
investment abroad complements the firm’s domestic operation.44 The supply-
chain model, and a correlation between intra-firm trade and FDI inflow, is 
the consequence of vertical FDI.45 Both vertical and horizontal investments 
can be of the greenfield, or merger and acquisition (M&A) mode. It is 
important to consider the difference between inflow of greenfield versus 
M&A investment to better evaluate the importance of the country’s 
regulatory environment to the promotion of inflow of FDI. Greenfield 
investment is the establishment of a business abroad from the ground up. 
M&A, or acquisition,46 is the acquisition of an existing business abroad. 
The current global trade market is no longer rigidly defined by import 
versus export interests, but by an interconnection of these interests, known 
as the supply-chain model. Supply-chain requires trade facilitation, logistics, 
and infrastructure such as border efficiency; all of which implicates more 
investment from businesses and states. Businesses, as they increase 
operational capital and investment in resources, know-how, and research 
across borders are requiring more protection not only for tangible, but for 
their intangible assets as well.47 
Greenfield investments require a long-term commitment of capital since 
the business is established from the ground up. This does not permit 
immediate, or even short-term return on the capital invested. In this case, it 
does not matter much if the investment is horizontal (as it is seeking access 
to a new market) or vertical (which promotes inflow of FDI as a result of 
intra-firm trade).48 Meanwhile, M&A requires lower sunk costs, as the 
acquired business is already established, which allows for an expectation of 
return on investment in a shorter period. In response to political uncertainties 
and economic crisis, the M&A investor may have an incentive to sell the 
investment, if possible, or at least reduce or suspend further inflow of capital, 
42 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 719. 
     43   Santos, supra note 16, at 596, 598. 
44 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 718-19. 
45 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 727. 
46 In this paper, the terms M&A and acquisition may be used interchangeably when 
talking about the type of investment where the investor acquires a business already established 
or expands an existing business but not enough to generate new business or create new a 
market. When the expansion of operations is expressive enough to generate new businesses or 
create new markets, it is considered a greenfield investment. 
 47 Richard Baldwin, WTO 2.0: Global Governance of Supply-Chain, CEPR POL’Y 
INSIGHT, Dec. 2012, at 1. Baldwin focuses on the importance of property rights protections 
but extending such to the protection of intangible assets such as technology and know-how; 
id. at 9, 15. 




depending mostly on the investment being horizontal or vertical.49 The 
greenfield investor, on the other hand, has an interest in maintaining a certain 
level of capital flow to avoid losing the investment altogether during the 
economic crises. 
One of the theories that explain an investor’s choice between greenfield 
and M&A investment is the communication-based theory.50 This theory 
establishes that the cost of communication is an important element to the 
decision-making process by multinational enterprises (MNEs) when 
deciding between greenfield or M&A investment in a foreign country.51 
Verbal communication is key to successful parent-subsidiary 
management, and there are four main reasons for such communication, (1) 
the need to exchange knowledge, (2) “the coordination of activities, (3) 
monitoring, and (4) socialization.”52 As expected, different languages 
between parent and subsidiary increase the cost of communication and is 
even higher in case of acquisition compared to greenfield investment.53 
Hence, acquisition may present higher communication costs because it 
requires more extensive parent-subsidiary communication due to the pre-
establishment of a business philosophy prior to the acquisition, which the 
new parent needs to change in order to maintain a homogenous identity with 
the new subsidiary. Although the key to understanding the investor’s 
decision-making process, the communication-based theory does not consider 
the other elements deliberated during the choice process.54 Some of the 
elements that are also important are the regulatory environment and, to some 
extent, the level of protection offered to foreign investments in the country 
of destination.55 
These other elements, not considered by the communication-based 
theory, are extensively discussed under transaction costs and property rights 
theories. In sum, the literature addresses the relationship between the host 
state’s contracts and property rights law along with the strong institutions and 
investments. Nobel Prize winner Douglass North argues that strong 
institutions provide property rights protections that encourage investments, 
which promotes production and organizational development, that leads to 
economic growth.56 
 49 In the case of horizontal investment, if the crisis has a strong impact on the firm’s 
market, it may be better to accept the loss and move altogether out of the market. Now in the 
case of vertical investment, it will depend on the correlation between intra-firm trade and the 
inflow of FDI. But in any case, a reduction of inflow of investment is expected. 
     50  Arjen H. L. Slangen, A Communication-Based Theory Choice Between Greenfield and 
Acquisition Entry, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 1699, 1719-21 (2011). 
51 Id at 1719-21 (2011). 
52 Id. at 1700. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1721-22. 
55 Id. at 1709-11. 
56 Id.; see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND 
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In the particular case of an international joint venture (IJV), applying 
the transaction cost theory to understand the reasons behind the formation of 
IJVs in developing countries,57 the literature shows that in the majority of 
IJVs the foreign partner brings the money and the domestic partner offers the 
local knowledge and real estate.58 In this partnership, the risk is shared 
between the foreign and the domestic partners. The IJV can be in either the 
acquisition or greenfield investment mode; hereafter, the same arguments 
presented above also apply to IJV. In M&A, the foreign partner will opt 
between ending the partnership or reducing influx of capital in a time of 
crisis. 
One way of evaluating the success of regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
is to consider the effects of intra-firm transactions in the country’s 
economy.59 According to this economic theory, foreign-owned 
manufacturing firms tend to concentrate trade with the country of origin of 
their capital.60 A direct relationship also exists between the “weight of foreign 
trade in relation to net earnings” and increases in a firm’s export to the 
country of origin of capital.61 The theory indicates that to compensate for 
trade diversion effects it is important to capture the investments that will 
generate intra-firm transactions.62 
The importance of identifying the elements considered by the investors 
during the decision-making process of selecting between greenfield and 
M&A lies in the welfare effect that each mode of FDI (greenfield vs. 
acquisition) inflow promotes. Ben Ferrett developed an economic model that 
allowed for the investigation of the interactions between greenfield and 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS (1990); 
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 
419 (July 1987); Gary D. Libecap, Douglass C. North: Transaction Costs, Property Rights, 
and Economic Outcomes, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24585, May 
2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24585. 
 57 See Bruce Kogut, Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 9 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 319 (1988) (Kogut applies transaction cost and strategic behavior 
theories to explain the motivation to joint venture). Pierre-Xavier Meschi, Government 
Corruption and Foreign Stakes in International Joint Ventures in Emerging Economies, 26 
ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 241 (2009) (Meschi isolates corruption as one of the causes of 
environmental uncertainty and economic instability in his analysis of the survival of IJVs in 
emerging Asian economies, under the light of transaction costs theory). 
 58 Id.; Kogut, supra note 57, at 327 (the author highlights the local legal knowledge as 
well as the understanding of the local marketing as key incentives for the formation of an IJV). 
 59 Renato Baumann & Francisco Galrão Carneiro, Behaviour of Brazilian Export Firms: 
Implications for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 78 CEPAL REV. 145 (2002). 
60 Id. at 146. 
61 Id. at 157. 
 62 Id. at 146. “Trade creation (emergence of new activities in the trade between the 
participating countries) and trade diversion (reduction of imports of products offered by third 
countries)”– are the two basic concepts the focus of most analysis of impact of trade. The 
authors found that the evaluation of integration process shows beneficial results when intra-




M&A foreign investment with other industry characteristics, such as 
investment level in R&D.63 The results present strong indications that M&A 
represents economic growth of the receiving country in the short run because 
it results in higher prices and lower consumer welfare, while greenfield 
investment increases consumer welfare and promotes stable economic 
growth in the long run.64 Greenfield investment promotes market growth, and 
even the establishment of new markets, which by definition is not promoted 
under M&A. Such results emphasize the need for developing countries to 
focus on balancing the inflow of greenfield investment with the inflow of 
M&A, which requires governmental long-term commitment to regulatory 
change in favor of a pro-market policy and strong property rights.65 
Now that we have an understanding of the different types of FDI and an 
overall view of the impact of each, I move to the discussion of NAFTA’s 
provisions on treatment of foreign investment and investor-state dispute 
settlement through international arbitration, along with its long-term binding 
effect on future governments. 
4. NAFTA AND MEXICO66
In light of the discussion above, it seems that NAFTA has presented the
necessary incentives to investors, increasing the inflow of greenfield 
investment in Mexico’s manufacturing industry from over $3 million in 2005 
to a little over $21 million in 2008.67 Even though NAFTA has been 
renegotiated and a new deal has been signed (the USMCA), my discussion 
will continue to focus on NAFTA since I am evaluating the impact of it up 
to now. Still, it is important to address here some of the changes that are 
introduced by the USMCA agreement once it enters into force. 
First of all, the elimination of internal tariffs, with a few exceptions, is 
still the main focus of USMCA as under NAFTA.68 The state-to-state dispute 
 63 See Ben Ferrett, Greenfield Investment Versus Acquisition: Alternative Modes of 
Foreign Expansion, (Univ. of Nottingham GEP Research Paper Series no. 39, 2005). This 
model includes level of investment in R&D and number of firms as endogenous variables, 
which allows for a more complex investigation of the interaction between greenfield and 
acquisition FDI. 
64  Id. at 14-15. 
     65  Libecap, supra note 56, in sum, weak property rights increase transaction costs, which 
increases risk of investment.  
66 Although NAFTA has been renegotiated and a new agreement (USMCA) will replace 
the current NAFTA once it is ratified by all three members, the historical motivation of 
NAFTA is still valid and important as it is still the agreement in force. Once USMCA enters 
into force in many sectors, such as auto rules of origin and ISDS under NAFTA Chapter 11, 
there is a phase in period of three years. Thus, NAFTA in many respects will control at least 
until 2024 and longer if ratification is delayed. 
67 Fingar, supra note 40, reporting greenfield investment in Mexico. 
 68 A copy of the signed USMCA document is available at https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-
between, (link last visited on September 18, 2019). The USMCA did not deviate from the 
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settlement mechanism69 has not been significantly altered, even though it is 
faulty because it allows the defendant state to stonewall the panel 
appointment process indefinitely.70 The investor-state dispute settlement 
mechanism (ISDS) suffered major alterations. In reality, ISDS is no longer 
available for foreign investors in Canada or the United States;71 however, 
ISDS access for U.S. investors in Mexico will exist, although considerably 
limited, except for a few key sectors such as hydrocarbons, power, 
telecommunications, and certain infrastructure.72 The impact of the new 
agreement and its significant lessening in investors’ protection may have an 
impact on future investment, but it is not the point of this paper, which 
concentrates on the results of NAFTA, from its establishment to now. 
Mexico’s motivations to join NAFTA were primarily economic in 
nature73. Mexico wanted to expand employment and exports through the 
maquiladora program or otherwise stimulate job growth and technology 
transfer, mitigate the impact of the 1982 financial crisis through trade 
liberalization,74 and increase the inflow of FDI.75 It followed the economic 
theory that boosting productivity growth—increasing total factor 
productivity (TFP)76—promotes growth in GDP per worker, boosting 
economic growth.77 
Also, Mexico had already initiated economic reform towards 
liberalization beginning in 1985, including but not limited to joining the 
main principle of freer trade between the three members. 
69 See NAFTA chapter 20, and USMCA chapter 31. 
 70 Sergio Puig, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: A Glimpse into the 
Geoeconomic World Order, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 56, 57 (2019); David Gantz, United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Settlement of Disputes 6 (Ariz. Legal Stud. Discussion 
Paper No. 19-08, 2019) [hereinafter Gantz, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement]. 
71 As for Canadian investors in Mexico and vice-versa, the protection would be under the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 9, Mar. 8, 2018, 
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/ 
agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/cptpp-ptpgp.aspx?lang=eng. 
 72 ISDS is found under NAFTA chapter 11 and USMCA chapter 14. I am not going to 
discuss the details of the changes from NAFTA to USMCA because this paper focuses on the 
impact of NAFTA from its creation to now, and USMCA enters into force in 2020. See 
generally John S. Baker & Lindsey Keiser, NAFTA/USMCA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 2 (2019); Puig, supra note 70; Gantz, 
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, supra note 70. 
     73  GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at 108. 
 74 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. NAFTA is still in force, which is the reason 
why the discussion here focuses on it even though USMCA will also be discussed here. 
75 Waldkirch, New Regionalism, supra note 33, at 152. 
76 According to Business Dictionary, TFP measures the efficiency of all inputs to a 
production process. TFP growth represents a part of the output not explained by the input used 
in production, usually from technological innovation or improvements. 




General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).78 President Salinas 
understood the importance of the pressure from treaty obligations to promote 
necessary internal reforms. NAFTA was seen by Mexico’s federal 
government as a security blanket that would impede future governments from 
returning to protectionist policies without breaching international 
obligations, truly embracing the open market philosophy.79 
At the time of NAFTA negotiations, the Uruguay Round was stalled and 
the political significance of this agreement to the three states was such that 
many items not yet implemented under WTO were incorporated into the 
agreement. NAFTA incorporated rules on foreign investment protections, 
trade in services, technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, 
intellectual property, government procurement, and investor-state dispute 
settlement provisions, to cite a few.80 Because of its all-inclusive 
characteristic, NAFTA became the model Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for 
all three members and influenced other countries’ FTA models as well. 
Even though NAFTA has no provisions for harmonization of laws, with 
the exception of Chapter 5 on harmonization of customs regulatory 
procedures,81 it has permitted the transplanting of U.S. laws into the Mexican 
legal system as Mexico introduced new laws and regulations implementing 
trade liberalization.82 NAFTA has assured foreign investors of Mexico’s 
commitment to reform; one example is the relaxation of rules on foreign 
ownership, which now allows for majority foreign ownership in Mexico.83 
The literature also credits the increase of FDI inflow into Mexico to 
NAFTA’s binding effect, to its duty-free treatment of most imports from 
Mexico into the United States, and to Mexico’s geographical proximity to 
the United States and Canada.84 It is estimated that FDI inflows in Mexico in 
the second half of the 1990s were about sixty percent higher than they would 
have been without NAFTA.85 
 78 Ivan T. Kandilov & Ash Leblebicioglu, Trade Liberalization and Investment: Firm-
level Evidence from Mexico, 26 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 320, 321, 323-24 (2012) (using 
data from 1984 to 1990, the authors wanted to evaluate the impact of the trade liberalization 
program launched in 1995. They found “that the decrease in input tariffs, as well as import 
license coverage, resulted in higher investment in Mexican manufacturing establishments”). 
79 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 710-711. 
80 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 105. 
81 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 115. Chapter 5 of NAFTA 
establishes the steps to be followed by an importer to acquire a NAFTA Certificate of Origin, 
which require a great deal of cooperation and coordination among the three members’ customs 
services. 
82 See Gillman, supra note 38. 
83 Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 715. 
84 Gillman, supra note 38, at 265; Waldkirch, New Regionalism, supra note 30, at 154, 
175. 
 85  Cuevas et al., supra note 37, at 473, 482. Demonstrating a study where the authors used 
a panel model to estimate total net inflows of FDI into a country considering indicators of 
macroeconomic stability and direct measure of globalization process. They concluded that 
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The major deregulation in the Mexican Foreign Investment Law has 
been the relaxation of Mexican rules restricting foreign ownership of 
enterprises in Mexico, which earlier limited foreign capital participation and 
control to forty-nine percent, but today is no longer applicable for 
investments of less than $150 million.86 The Foreign Investment Law of 
1993, which allows foreign investors to control up to 100% of a Mexican 
enterprise, also prohibited foreign investors’ access to some activities that 
had been reserved exclusively to the Mexican Government and/or to Mexican 
citizens.87 Mexico’s ranking on the “Ease of Doing Business” indicator88 
from the 2011-2015 period compared to the 2006-2010 period had improved 
on a steady pace (from 43 to 38), contrary to Brazil’s ranking, which had 
worsened across the same periods (from 111 to 116).89 
The more stringent requirements imposed by NAFTA provisions on 
technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, intellectual 
property, and ISDS have increased the competitiveness of Mexican 
industry.90 This is especially true when compared with Brazilian industry, 
which is inefficient and not competitive since it depends on state subsidies 
and protectionist regulations, including but not limited to high protective 
tariffs.91 In any event, it is undeniable that Mexico’s commitment to open 
markets, reflected in unilateral reductions of applied tariffs in recent years to 
about five to six percent92, and the implementation of changes to its legal 
FDI was sixty percent higher as a result of “NAFTA-induced exports”); Waldkirch, New 
Regionalism, supra note 33, at 168 (explaining that the Waldkirch estimation has quite similar 
results, as it concluded that FDI in Mexico would be below forty-two percent without 
NAFTA). 
 86 Michael W. Goldman et al., An Introduction to Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico, 5 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 111-13 (1994); Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico’s Foreign 
Investment Act of 1993, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 907, 927 (1994). 
87 The foreign participation in regulated activities is limited to certain percentages varying 
between 10%, 25%, and 49%, according to article 7 of FIL 1993. Goldman et al., supra note 
76, at 115-16, 118-19 (presenting a detailed analysis of the evolution of Foreign Investment 
Law in Mexico); Vargas, supra note 86, at 912, 926, 936-37. 
 88 The “ease of doing business” is an indicator developed by the World Bank that ranks 
economies based on their regulatory environment. The World Bank provides details on the 
elements evaluated by this indicator and a complete ranking list. Ease of Doing Business Index 
(Most Business-Friendly Regulations), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
IC.BUS.EASE.XQ (last visited March 17, 2021) [hereinafter World Bank Index]. 
 89 R. Shyam Khemani & Ana Carrasco-Martin, The Investment Climate, Competition 
Policy, and Economic Development in Latin America, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67 (2008); 
World Bank Index, supra note 88 (indicating that the rankings for the periods above were 
collected from the “ease of doing business”). 
90 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 105. 
     91   Canuto and Reis, supra note 29, at 8; Rafael A. Porrata-Doria Jr., MERCOSUR: The 
Common Market of the Twenty-First Century?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2004), 
throughout the paper, Porrata-Doria discusses Brazil’s protectionist measures and tariffs 
92   David A. Gantz, The Risks and Rewards of Renegotiating the North American Trade 
Relationship, 33 MD. J. INT'l L. 127-161, 149 (2018). Gantz, Regional Trade Agreements, 




system93 are the key difference between Brazilian and Mexican policy 
strategies. 
Simple observation of data collected in the late 1990s gives a false 
impression that NAFTA did not impact Mexico’s FDI inflow when it is 
compared to FDI inflow to other Latin American Countries.94 However, 
applying a flexible statistic model, Monge-Naranjo was able to confirm that 
NAFTA did indeed help Mexico attract more FDI than its neighbors.95 These 
findings are confirmed by another study using empirical data and regression 
model research, which demonstrated an increase in investments in Mexico, 
more from partners—the United States and Canada—but also from other 
countries, as an effect of NAFTA.96 
Mexico suffered some setbacks in the first year of NAFTA that are 
credited with lessening the positive effects expected from the agreement.97 
The uprising of southern states unhappy with alleged special attention offered 
to the northern states, the assassination of presidential candidate Luis 
Colosio, the uprisings in Chiapas, and the peso crisis beginning in December 
199498 scared some of the investors who were afraid of the political and 
economic repercussions of these issues.99 Mexico’s industry also lost some 
enterprises because of lower manufacturing costs in China, but the country 
was able to recover because of Mexico’s strong commitment to trade 
liberalization and global competition through efficient industrialization.100 
93    GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 156. 
 94 Alexander Monge-Naranjo, The Impact of NAFTA on Foreign Direct Investment Flows 
in Mexico and the Excluded Countries, NW. UNIV. (2002), http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/ 
north/monge.pdf; Rene Cabral et al., Capital and Labour Mobility and Their Impact on 
Mexico’s Regional Labour Market, 46 J. DEV. STUD. 1523, 1523-42 (2010). 
95 Id. Monge-Naranjo explains that the model is a flexible one because it excludes the FDI 
from privatization. In the late 1990s, many Latin American countries, including Brazil, had 
captured FDI by privatizing oil, energy, mining, and other sectors that were controlled by the 
government. As investment captured by privatization is not in competition with investment 
fomented by NAFTA, the flexible model allows for a better evaluation and assessment of the 
impact of NAFTA in Mexico’s FDI inflow. 
 96 Cabral et al., supra note 94; Waldkirch, New Regionalism, supra note 33. Waldkirch 
clarifies that Mexico was leading in FDI inflow until Brazil started its privatization process, 
which brought most Acquisition-FDI into Brazil. 
 97 Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., NAFTA at 20: Misleading Charges and Positive 
Achievements, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 2014), http://www.piie.com/ 
publications/pb/pb14-13.pdf; Cuevas et al., supra note 37. The authors speculate that a hold 
on privatization in Mexico was one of the explanations. 
 98 Cuevas et al., supra note 37. Also known as the Tequila crisis, the peso crisis may have 
had a lesser negative weight as it reduced the cost of production in Mexico. However, it still 
explains the lukewarm performance. 
99 Hufbauer et al., supra note 97. 
 100 Id.; Two Ways to Make a Car, THE ECONOMIST, (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21549950/print. It is also important to remember here that 
cost of labor in China had increased and some business that had gone to China are returning 
to the NAFTA bloc. Still, Vietnam and India are viable competitors for the labor-intensive 
industry that is moving from China. 
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NAFTA has positively impacted Mexico, especially because of the 
incorporation of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, which 
demonstrated Mexico’s commitment to a “pro-international law” policy.101 
Nonetheless, it is the domestic implementation of the necessary pro-trade 
environment through regulatory reforms that had bolstered and solidified the 
effect and impact of the economic integration agreement.102 
The disputes brought by investors before various international 
arbitration bodies, under NAFTA Chapter 11, tested the binding effect of the 
dispute settlement provisions and the limitations imposed to the Mexican 
government by the obligations assumed under the agreement.103 Foreign 
investment and arbitration laws can be considered “global administrative 
law,”104 even though they are not uniform, because of the powerful influence 
exerted by them within governmental agencies.105 These “laws” limit the 
agencies and judiciary power to implement protectionist rules, offering the 
necessary protection to foreign investors.106 
Many of the commitments assumed by Mexico had not been followed 
by the necessary public policy reforms at the proper speed. If Mexico had 
promoted the development of infrastructure and logistics, along with reforms 
in labor laws, education policies, and the development of agricultural labor 
affected by NAFTA (corn imported from the United States instead of 
domestically produced displaced unskilled labor), it would be a more 
competitive country today, less dependent on the existence of NAFTA.107 It 
is important to mention here that Mexico promoted the implementation of 
key reforms in 2013, which were ignited by the “Pacto por Mexico,”108 and 
included the reforms of the education and energy sectors.109 
 101 Claus von Wobeser, Mexico, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWS, TREATIES, AND DISPUTES FOR INVESTORS, STATE, AND 
COUNSEL 361 (Jonathan C. Hamilton et al. eds., 2012). 
 102 Monge-Naranjo, supra note 94. By comparing the increase in FDI in Mexico (under 
NAFTA) and Costa Rica (under the Caribbean Basin Initiative), Monge-Naranjo found that 
just an agreement is not enough to increase FDI. This was concluded because Costa Rica 
benefited the most from CBI since it implemented the necessary regulatory reforms. 
103 Monge-Naranjo, supra note 94. 
 104 Here, I use such comparison to facilitate the understanding of the impact of ISDS in 
curtailing domestic protectionist rules. However, I do not ascribe to the new line of study that 
recommends that international law, especially WTO dispute settlement, be enforced under the 
full lenses of administrative law. 
105 Javier Robalino-Orellana, International Investment and Administrative Law in Latin 
America, 101 AM. SOCY. INTL. L. PROC. 465 (2007). 
106 Id. 
107 Cuevas et al., supra note 37. 
108 Pacto por Mexico is a political document signed by then-President of Mexico Pena 
Nieto, the President of the National Action Party, the Chair of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party, the Chair of the Party of Democratic Revolution, the party of the current President, and 
the Green Party of Mexico. The pact framed Mexico’s public policy proposals including 
education and energy reforms. 




The reform of the energy sector was designed to open a sector where 
both domestic and foreign private investment were traditionally barred by the 
Mexican Constitution, eventually allowing for foreign investment in the 
energy sector, which should become a major driver of Mexico’s economic 
growth.110 The Mexican Constitution was amended and the Energy Reform 
Plan was signed into law in December 2013 by President Pena Nieto.111 
These reforms have brought much excitement among investors; however, the 
convoluted regulatory framework could be holding back the development of 
most of the projects. The question now is if President Lopez-Obrador will 
support the reforms as they have been orchestrated by his predecessor. A 
possible hindrance could be the return of nationalism to Mexico’s public 
policy, which was the candidacy promise of Mr. Lopez-Obrador, in line with 
the new Moreno Party (formerly with the leftist Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (“PRD”)). It is worth mentioning here that in the sectors of oil 
and gas, energy power, transportation, telecommunications, and some 
infrastructure, protection for foreign investment under USMCA was not 
eliminated, but it has been limited to contracts signed with the Mexican 
government. Such protection may be an indication that President Obrador 
may follow the Energy Reform Plan. 112 
Furthermore, Mexico’s reforms in investment law and secured 
transactions law, among other regulatory reforms, have opened the door to 
greenfield investment, which is a long-term investment. Even without ISDS 
protections and enforceable labor protections under USMCA, if Mexico does 
not panic and adversely react, one can expect that it should be able to retain 
most of the manufacturing industries already established there. due to the 
costs of disinvestment and the many other factors that made Mexico an 
important destination for U.S. manufacturing, including its proximity to the 
United States, low wage costs,113 and a twenty-five-year history of friendly 
Pacto por México Después de Cinco Acinco ños: ¿Cómo le ha ido?, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y 
RES. (June 2018),  http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/mexico-spn-2018-06.pdf. 
 110 José Ramón Cossío Díaz & José Ramón Cossío Barragán, The New Energy System in 
the Mexican Constitution, in THE RULE OF THE LAW AND MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM, JAMES
A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY (2017).
  111  Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución 
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en Materia de Energía [Decree that Amends 
Provisions of Mexico’s Constitution Concerning Energy], published at the DIARIO 
OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACIÓN (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://
www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_212_20dic13.pdf. 
 112 See Baker & Keiser, supra note 72; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 14, Annex, 14-D, Annex 14-E, Nov. 30, 2018, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/14-Investment.pdf. 
 113 Even though USMCA added enforceable labor protections under chapter 25, and the 
“rapid response labor mechanism” under chapter 31, there has been criticism that these 
measures are not strong enough to make an expressive impact on cost of labor. However, as 
the USMCA is not the focus of this paper here, I refrain from assuming any strong position of 
the future cost of wages. 
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government policies, among others. 
Under the USMCA, a few provisions have suffered extensive 
modifications.114 NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute mechanism has been 
eliminated between the United States and Canada, and has been limited for 
use between Mexico and the United States, as I have mentioned above. As 
for the Rules of Origin and Regional Value content, although the United 
States wanted to bring the minimum North American content up from 62.5% 
to 85%, a compromise was reached at 75%.115 
Another key issue for the United States was the low labor wages in 
Mexico; USMCA addresses this by requiring that 40% of auto and 45% of 
small truck content must be made by workers making at least $16.00 per hour 
(for the most part only obtainable in the United States and Canada). Another 
important change is the introduction of the Sunset Clause stating that the 
agreement ends in 16 years unless the parties agree to extend it.116 USMCA 
also requires Mexico to implement legislation that permits independent 
unions with full collective-bargaining powers, up to now a rarity in Mexican 
unions.117 
The impact and general success of this new agreement once it enters 
into force depend in significant part on Mexico’s implementation of the still 
necessary reforms, which should allow for some independence from its 
partners, the United States and Canada. Mexico has the potential to capture 
more investment from other countries and regions. According to data for the 
first quarter of 2019, from Statista.com,118 Mexican inflow of FDI from 
NAFTA members was at 48%, of which only 5% was from Canada. The 
second biggest investor in Mexico is Spain (13.8%), trailed by Belgium 
(6.9%) and the Netherlands (5.2%).119 Spain and Belgium are already 
investing at higher levels than Canada, but the NAFTA members are still 
responsible for almost 50% of all the FDI in Mexico.120 
As I mentioned before, Brazil opened its market around the same time 
 114 See supra text accompanying note 72; see also GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, 
supra note 15, at 144. The author shows that the initial proposal from the United States would 
allow the state to opt out of the ISDS altogether. Instead, a categorization of the process is the 
final product. 
 115 See generally Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican 
States, and Canada, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 4, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/04%20Rules%20of%20Origin.pdf. 
 116 USMCA, Article 34.7 of final provisions, Full text provided by the US Trade 
Representative at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_ 
Final_Provisions.pdf. 
117 See USMCA, annex 23-A. 
 118 Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Mexico in 3rd quarter 2019, by 
Country of Origin, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/709875/fdi-mexico-origin/ 
(last visited Novermber 24, 2019). The data presented here is from Statista.com and refers to 






as Mexico but adopted a different policy, a more protectionist policy. 
MERCOSUR was signed with the promise of an integration between its 
South American members and a movement towards a freer market.121 Next, 
I evaluate the MERCOSUR and its impact in Brazil. 
5. MERCOSUR AND BRAZIL
MERCOSUR has suffered many setbacks during its twenty-five plus
years of existence. The impeachment of Brazil’s President in 1992, the 
Argentine great depression and devaluation in 1998, and the global financial 
crisis of 2008 are some of the developments that retarded the success of 
MERCOSUR.122 Despite the setbacks, it is necessary to recognize that the 
commerce within the bloc had increased, along with the fact that Brazil, 
Argentina, and Uruguay had opened key markets to private investors through 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.123 However, in the long run, it is 
evident that MERCOSUR members, especially Brazil, have not fully 
embraced more open markets and liberalization of trade.124 They rushed into 
an ambitious agreement that required domestic commitment to implement, 
even if gradually, the adoption of open market policies and coordination of 
macroeconomic policies among the members.125 Such coordination involves 
trust, political, social, and economic synchronization among the members for 
the domestic implementation of trade liberalization, especially when 
implementing policies addressing the effects of external shocks. 
To better understand its impact on Brazil’s economic growth, I evaluate 
the MERCOSUR under four categories identified as key to understanding 
why it never succeeded in becoming the expected powerful bloc of the 
Southern Cone. First, based on Buchanan et al., finding that “institutional 
quality has a positive and significant effect on FDI,”126 I evaluate the strength 
of the institutions established under the MERCOSUR. Second, I review the 
121 Santos, supra note 16, at 555. 
122 José Manuel Quijano, MERCOSUR: ¿el relanzamiento?, 199 NUEVA SOCIEDAD 53, 53-
58 (2005). The author analyzed the major economic issues that affected the bloc and its 
member in his study of MERCOSUR from 1986 through 2005. The paper pinpoints the major 
economic policies adopted by each member and how it impacted the bloc. 
123 Id. Here Quinjano mentions that from 1990 to 1999 there was an important movement 
for denationalization of state-owned enterprises with Argentina leading the bloc, while Brazil 
and Uruguay’s efforts towards privatization were more timid. 
124   Santos, supra note 16, at 600. 
 125 Paulo Roberto Almeida, Uma Historia do MERCOSUR do Nascimento à Crise, 191 
REVISTA ESPAÇO ACADÊMICO 106 (2011). Paulo Roberto is a Brazilian diplomat and professor 
of Political Economy in Brazil. In this article, the author discusses the many issues that have 
weakened the bloc along its lifetime. 
126 Buchanan et al, supra note 25. The authors’ regression model examined the relationship 
between institutional quality and volatility of FDI and found an inverse relationship between 
volatility of FDI and institutional quality. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 41:139 (2021) 
162 
lack of harmonization of macroeconomic policy among its members; third, I 
assess the efforts, if any, to implement the necessary harmonization of law 
within the bloc; and finally, fourth, I discuss the members’ commitment to 
trade liberalization and the existence, or not, of binding and enforceable 
commitments within the provisions of the MERCOSUR agreement. 
A. Failure to Establish Strong Institutions under MERCOSUR
The MERCOSUR bloc was a response to the establishment of the 
European Union (E.U.) and NAFTA. The adoption of more open trade 
policies worldwide, combined with Brazil’s desire to establish itself as a 
powerful political as well as economic leader in South America, and the 
lacuna left by the decline of the United States’ influence in the region, was 
the breeding ground for the formation of the bloc.127 All four initial members 
– Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay – benefited from a similar
political momentum as new democracies willing to take part in the economic
liberalization movement that was taking place in the world.128 The members
had participated in previous, less ambitious endeavors towards trade
liberalization under the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in
1960, later replaced by the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI
in Spanish), and had established limited cooperation among themselves in
the past.129 However, the MERCOSUR was a plan too ambitious for the
existing infrastructure, which was not strong enough to support an effective
planning and implementation of the MERCOSUR. Weak infrastructure, as
well as the members’ unwillingness to effectively implement the necessary
institutions, lead to the bloc’s failure.
Mattli offers an analytical framework that was adopted by Hummel and 
Lohaus in the analysis of the MERCOSUR.130 According to Mattli’s 
model131, the strength of the institutions impacts the success of the regional 
agreement as it can offset the risks brought by the uncertainty of the behavior 
of each member. The Treaty of Asuncion132 created a basic but complex 
structure that required a series of treaties and protocols for its 
implementation.133 The structure was inspired by the E.U.; however, the 
members of MERCOSUR did not have the same commitment to the rule of 
 127 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15; Felix Hummel & Mathis 
Lohaus, MERCOSUR: Integration through Presidents and Paymasters, in ROADS TO 
REGIONALISM: GENESIS, DESIGN AND EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 59 (Tanja A. 
Borzel et. al. ed., 2012). 
 128 Porrata-Doria Jr., supra note 91; Gabriel Gari, Regional Integration: Comparative 
Experiences: Free Circulation of Services in MERCOSUR: A Pending Task, 10 LAW & BUS. 
REV. AM. 545 (2004). 
129 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 368. 
130 Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 127, at 59-77. 
131 Id., at 60. 
132 The Treaty of Asuncion, signed on March 26, 1991, established the MERCOSUR. 




law or to the implementation and development of the bloc as the European 
states had and still have. The institutions under MERCOSUR have never had 
the same independence, power, and degree of commitment as the ones within 
the E.U.134 
Many of the protocols that created important institutions have not 
entered into force because the members have not ratified them, or they have 
not been implemented because they require domestic regulatory reform by 
each member, and such reforms have not yet been adopted.135 Also, the 
decisions, norms, and protocols that entered into force are not always 
executed at the domestic level because the institutions established within the 
MERCOSUR do not have the power to monitor and enforce the domestic 
execution of the regulations approved by the bloc.136 Although the 
MERCOSUR regulations are supposed to be binding, the need for ratification 
and the absence of efficient monitoring and enforcement remedies permit the 
members to defect as they please. 
Weak institutions give emphasis to Presidential diplomacy as the 
liberalization process requires constant participation and influence at the 
presidential level to be successful.137 The presidents, especially of Argentina 
and Brazil, set the agenda, define the foreign policy, and, most importantly, 
set the focus of the MERCOSUR.138 The development of the bloc is strongly 
dependent on each member’s domestic agenda and its changes or stalls, as 
new governments are elected, which is aggravated also by the fact that the 
members are not in sync when it comes to their diplomatic policies.139 
Furthermore, the bloc does not cultivate a strong strategic agenda with long-
term planning and incentives for implementation of approved measures.140 
B. Lack of Harmonization of Macroeconomic Policies
MERCOSUR has its merits as the state members went from “restricted
trade to a practically free-trade area[,]”141 but it could have achieved broader 
 134 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 365-92. The author presents 
the structure of MERCOSUR, and not much has changed since the book’s publication. For a 
complete updated organogram with detailed information on each institution established under 
the MERCOSUR and their respective functions and attributions, visit the MERCOSUR page 
available at https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/institucional/organograma-mercosul/ (last visited 
January 28, 2019). 
 135 For a complete list of the protocols, norms, and agreements signed under the 
MERCOSUR along with their status visit http://www.mre.gov.py/tratados/public_web/ 
ConsultaMercosur.aspx (last visited January 28, 2019). 
136 Id. 
137 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15. 
138 Mario E. Carranza, Can Mercosur Survive? Domestic and International Constraints on 
Mercosur, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 45, No. 2, 67-103, (Summer, 2003), 
139 Id at 75. 
140 Id at 69. 
 141 Paulo Paiva & Ricardo Gazel, MERCOSUR: Past, Present, and Future, 13 NOVA 
ECONOMIA BELO HORIZONTE 115, (2003). 
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importance and a leading role in bringing South America into the globalized 
trade market. Instead of embracing open trade as the bloc public policy, the 
countries’ economies are dependent on state subsidies and protection of 
selected industries through high tariffs, as economists call it industrialization 
by import substitution, with the state as the main investor in domestic 
production, all of which reduces imports.142 Such policy results in an in 
efficient and non-competitive industry that is easily swayed by domestic and 
international economic fluctuations.143 
From 1997 to around 2002, the financial world experienced the Asian 
financial crisis, the default by Russia on its debts, the devaluation of the 
Brazilian currency, and the Argentine economic crisis.144 Brazil and the other 
members of MERCOSUR reestablished trade barriers to protect their own 
industries.145 The bloc did not present any effort to coordinate a united 
response to the issues.146 The uncoordinated response to the external crises 
and unilateral implementation of protectionist policies damaged the bloc’ 
credibility among members, outside partners, and international lenders and 
investors.147 It confirmed to the world that the MERCOSUR members lacked 
commitment to open market policies, to the integration process, and to the 
success of MERCOSUR as a regional trade bloc.148 
Brazil has pursued an import substitution policy since the end of the 
Second World War as a strategy to grow selected key industries.149 At that 
time, the strategy favored the establishment of Brazil’s industry with foreign 
capital because there was no “know-how” and there were no proper funding 
opportunities to help domestic firms grow or to help nationals acquire 
capital.150 The result was an artificially induced industrialization dependent 
on foreign and government-funded capital.151 In the past, import substitution 
promoted rapid growth, which was not, and still is not, sustainable in the long 
run as it does not increase real income and consumption. Meanwhile, it 
increases potential future liability due to capital flight risk.152 Under such a 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Carranza, supra note 138, at 69-71. 
145 Paiva & Gazel, supra note 141 at 127. 
146 Porrata-Doria, supra note 91; Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 127. 
147 Graphic 1 shows how unstable is the inflow of FDI in Brazil. Also, it has already been 
demonstrated that the members of the bloc do not coordinate their public policies, Finally, the 
multidisciplinary literature presented emphasize the importance of institutional credibility for 
the promotion of FDI inflow. All supporting this author’s assumption.  
148 As I said here before, it is not BITs that promote FDI, but the RTAs that do promote 
FDI. However, it still requires domestic commitment to the terms of the RTA. 
 149 Samuel A. Morley & Gordon W. Smith, Import Substitution and Foreign Investment in 
Brazil, 23 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 120, 135 (1971). 
150 Id. at 130. 
151 Id. at 131. 
 152 Id. at 132 (in this study, Morley & Smith emphasized the lack of commitment from 




policy, with tariffs protecting the domestic industry, local goods are more 
expensive and, more often than not, they are of low quality when compared 
to the competing goods offered in the world market. 
During the 2003-2017 period, the bloc experienced a sharp shift in its 
trade policy as left-wing governments were established in the region. Under 
the guidance of Mr. Lula in Brazil, and Mr. Kirchner in Argentina, 
MERCOSUR lost its focus on trade.153 Lula and Kirchner marked the 
relaunch of MERCOSUR with a new agenda. A new dimension for 
integration within the bloc was introduced, with the focus moving from open 
international economic trade policy to a social-political policy.154 Starting in 
the earlier 2000s, the MERCOSUR was used as a tool for political regime 
integration, moving away from its foundational purpose.155 The suspension 
of Paraguay and the accession of Venezuela in 2012 (since suspended) was 
a series of political maneuvers to consolidate the new purpose of the bloc.156 
The suspension of Paraguay was the bloc’s response to the impeachment of 
its left-wing president in 2012, and permitted the admission of Venezuela as 
a full member on that same year, which had been blocked by Paraguay.157 
This maneuver was the formalization of MERCOSUR’s divorce from its 
initial goal of integration through free trade of goods and services. Proffessor 
Porrata-Doria, in his reevaluation of the MERCOSUR, emphasized that the 
accession of Venezuela changed the focus of the bloc since the idea of 
integration under the late president, Hugo Chavez, was “incompatible with . 
. . open markets and free trade,”158 which has remained the case under Mr. 
Maduro. 
New unilateral policies amplifying the negative effects of the 2007-
political instability). 
 153 Mariana Vazques & Jose Briceno Ruiz, O Mercosul na Epoca de Lula e Kirchner: Um 
Balanco, Seis Anos Depois, NUEVA SOCIEDAD 33, 48 (2009). The authors applaud the new 
multidimensional approach of MERCOSUR integration; however, they do not consider the 
economic implications of such a change in focus. 
154 Id. 
155 Porrata-Doria, supra note 91. 
156 Guilherme Frizzera, A Suspensao do Paraguai no Mercosul: Problema Interno, 
Solucao Externa, 2 CONJUNTURA GLOBAL 156, 164 (2003). 
 157 Venezuela had not been fully admitted before because Paraguay would not ratify the 
country’s accession, and with the suspension of Paraguay, its ratification became unnecessary. 
Brazil’s push for Paraguay’s suspension has been seen as a political maneuver to facilitate that 
accession of Venezuela since Paraguay was not willing to ratify Venezuela’s accession. See 
Mercosur Suspends Paraguay over Lugo Impeachment, BBC (June 29, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18636201; Paraguay Suspended from 
MERCOSUR, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2012/jun/30/paraguay-suspended-mercosur; Guido Nejamkis & Ana Flor, Mercosur 
welcomes Venezuela, suspends Paraguay, REUTERS (June 29, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-MERCOSUR-idUSBRE85S1JT20120630. 
 158 Rafael A. Porrata-Doria Jr., MERCOSUR at Twenty: From Adolescence to Adulthood?, 
27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1 (2013). 
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2009 economic crisis affecting the region were implemented.159 As could 
have been anticipated, such policies produced distortions to the economic 
relationship among the members and with foreign investors, once more 
negatively impacting economic integration and economic growth in the 
region and solidifying MERCOSUR and Brazil’s economic irrelevance in the 
global marketplace.160 
The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, which started in the 
United States and spread quickly because of globalized trade and financial 
markets, did not spare the Latin American countries.161 Although the problem 
deserves a more in depth analysis not offered here, it is fair to say that the 
slowdown in China’s investments in South American countries’ 
infrastructure, along with the relationship between China’s exports and South 
American imports and exports (particularly Argentinian and Brazilian soy 
exports and Brazilian iron ore exports) have contributed to the still-lingering 
effects experienced by Brazil and Argentina.162 Without fully returning to 
closed trade market models, many countries had adopted some protectionist 
measures to safeguard key industries and export sectors.163 Such measures 
were often labeled as “stimulus packages.”164 But they were protectionist, 
nevertheless. 
Brazil adopted stimulus packages to “improve energy and transportation 
services, support social and urban housing projects.”165 However, recent 
criminal investigations conducted in Brazil166 have indicated that much of 
this money was illegally diverted into the pockets of various government 
officials.167 Such political crises, combined with the lack of commitment to 
open market policies, may be further exacerbating the devastating 
consequences of the most recent economic crisis experienced by Brazil. 
159 Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 127; Carranza, supra note 138; Paiva, & Gazel supra 
note 141.  
 160 Gabriel V. Montes-Rojas, A Note to Building a Counterfactual for MERCOSUR, 15 
LATIN AM. BUS. REV. 315 (2014). 
 161 Padideh Ala’I, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Trade and Investment, 104 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 447 (2010). 
 162 Under “leftist” governments, Brazil’s and Argentina’s high spending during the boom 
period of China’s investment is prolonging even more the effects of China’s slowdown. 
163 Quijano, supra note 122. 
164 Ala’I, supra note 161, at 448. 
165 Id., at 449. 
166 The “carwash operation” (Operacao Lava-Jato) was launched in 2006 to investigate 
alleged involvement of a former Congress representative in money laundering. By 2013, many 
members of the President’s party and officers of the high government were indicted or under 
investigation. The investigation has indictments all the way up to both Presidents from the 
Worker’s Party, Mr. Lula and Mrs. Dilma Rousseff. 
 167 In April 2016, Ms. Dilma Rousseff was the second President of Brazil to be impeached. 
Now, not only Ms. Rousseff but many of her allies, cabinet members, and associates, are still 
being investigated for corruption during her government as well as during the tenure of 
previous president, Mr. Lula da Silva. President Lula was jailed from April 2018 until 




The political turmoil being experienced by South American countries, 
focusing here on Brazil and Argentina, is slowing the process for social and 
economic recovery168. The slow recovery of these two economies is 
negatively impacting Paraguay, Uruguay, and the other members of the 
MERCOSUR.169 Brazilian President Bolsonaro is trying to stimulate the 
economy by reducing expenditures, easing up financial and commercial 
regulations, and reducing bureaucracy.170 Many of the proposed reforms aim 
at moving Brazil up in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking.171 
Argentina seems to be moving towards a different track. After losing the 
August primary, President Mauricio Macri tried adopting more Peronist 
policies in an effort to win elections against the leaders of the opposition, Mr. 
Alberto Fernandez, and his vice president, Ms. Cristina Kirchner. However, 
Macri lost the elections and, as President, Mr. Fernandez is bringing 
Argentina back to Peronism.172  
C. Harmonization of Laws
MERCOSUR’s ultimate success as a mechanism for economic
integration and economic development throughout the region requires the 
standardization of regulations and efficacious implementation of its law.173 
Many decisions, resolutions, and protocols have been approved by the 
members with definitions and regulations to guide the market participants in 
a more interventionist fashion, which is in line with civil law tradition.174 
However, the success of this approach requires strong institutions with the 
necessary power to monitor and enforce the domestic implementation of 
     168 Here I am referring to the popular revolt in Venezuela; the popular manifestation of 
dissatisfaction with the left-wing governments that plagued Brazil; the effects of the “carwash 
operation,” which led to the prison of Mr. da Silva, the bustling elections in Brazil (which 
elected President Bolsonaro under the promises of end of corruption and economic reforms, 
and the Argentinean economic crisis that influence the election of the center-left opposition 
candidate Mr. Alberto Fernández. 
     169 Carranza, supra note 138 at 75, 76 (the impact of Brazilian crisis in the other members), 
at 82 and 83 (the dependency of the other members on Brazil and Argentina), at 93 (how 
Brazil’s devaluation affected the bloc); at 98 (Paraguay and Uruguay cannot leave the bloc 
due to its economic dependency).  
 170 The biggest step so far has been the reform of the Brazilian social security system, 
which is in the final phase of approval by congress as of the writing of this paper. Without this 
reform, Brazil is expected to be bankrupt in less than ten years. 
 171 As of 2019, Brazil ranks 109 out of 190. The Ease of Doing Business rank can be 
accessed at https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
172 Mr. Fernandez is a member of the nationalist Peronist movement, and defended the 
return of Peronist policies during his presidential campaign. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
argentinas-alberto-fernandez-leads-results-of-presidential-vote-with-47-2-support-
11572223112 (last accessed in May 2021). 
    173 Porrata- Doria supra note 90, at 10, 17, 57-58, 69-70; Gantz supra note 15, at 365 and 
391; Paiva supra note 140, at 125; Hummel & Lohaus supra note 127, at 65. 
 174 See FRANCISCO DUINA, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FREE TRADE: THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, NAFTA, AND MERCOSUR (2006). 
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these rules. 
The institutions within MERCOSUR are weak and do not foster the 
proper environment for the coordination and unified application of proper 
market policies. Professor Trachtman’s analytical framework and theory of 
international economic organizations show that for the success of an 
integration mechanism, it is necessary that the members empower the 
institutions and relinquish control over common affairs to the 
MERCOSUR,175 as we can observe under the European Union. Rulemaking 
authority, which sets the responsibilities and benefits of the market actors 
and promotes regulatory predictability, will reduce the influence of 
uncommitted members and the risk of unpredictable and uncoordinated 
individual response to an economic downturn, crisis, or recession.176 Key 
protocols have not been properly implemented by the members up to the 
writing of this paper, illustrating the current state of disharmonized 
legislation within MERCOSUR.177 The investor-state dispute resolution 
established through the Protocol of the Colonia and the Non-Party Protocol 
has not been ratified by any of the members since their signature more than 
a decade ago.178 
D. Lack of Commitment to Trade Liberalization
There are many examples of public policies adopted by the members
that depart from the goals of MERCOSUR. In 1999, Argentina imposed 
import quotas on some of the goods traded with Brazil in response to the 
devaluation of the real.179 In 2012, Brazil and Argentina had adopted 
protective measures to balance trade in cars and parts under the Car 
Agreement with Mexico, which resulted in the renegotiation of the 
agreement changing the provisions from tariffs to tariff-rate quotas, in spite 
of Mexican efforts to increase trade liberalization under the agreement.180 
Furthermore, the Common External Tariff (CET) still has special products 
that the members can set their own tariffs independently from each other.181 
 175 Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of International Economic 
Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470 
(1996). 
176 Porrata-Doria, supra note 91, at 41, 61, 71. 
 177 For a full list of all Protocols decisions and treaties under the MERCOSUR and status 
information visit https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documentos-e-normativa/tratados/. 
178 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 380. 
179 The real has been the Brazilian currency since 1994. When it was introduced, the real 
had a fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar of 1:1, but such a plan was not sustainable, and 
the 1998/1999 economic recession led to the devaluation of the real. 
180 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 100. 
    181 Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS supra note 15, at 370. In December 2020, the 
Brazilian government informed, through its official media vehicle, “Agencia Brasil”, that the 
revision of the CET has been postponed to 2021 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/ 
politica/noticia/2020-12/mercosur-puts-common-externa. For the CET most current list, visit 




The bloc does not have sufficient coordination for the treatment of tariff 
distribution among themselves after entry of goods; for this reason, if the 
goods cross borders within the bloc they pay duty twice.182 No customs union 
can function without the implementation of a system that collects the 
common tariffs at the port of entry and remits it to the country of ultimate 
destination.183 Finally, more than twenty-five years have passed since the 
establishment of MERCOSUR and still, there is neither full integration nor 
free trade of goods, and not much improvement in intra-regional trade in 
services.184 
E. Other Considerations
MERCOSUR was established over twenty-five years ago with
ambitious goals towards liberalization of trade and regional socio-economic 
integration. It was intended to give a voice to South America in the 
globalization arena and crown Brazil as an influential country both politically 
and economically not only in the Southern Cone but globally. Today the bloc 
has not developed much beyond the progress achieved during its first five 
years of existence. It has neither achieved the goal of integration among the 
members nor has it become the voice representing South America. The 
MERCOSUR members identified the structure required to achieve its goals 
in its earlier years; nonetheless, they have not been able to develop and 
implement them as a strong independent body.185 
MERCOSUR never acquired the necessary independence from the 
members’ governments, maintaining its initial intergovernmental approach. 
As if an infant, MERCOSUR is still dependent on presidential diplomacy to 
determine and implement the bloc’s agenda.186 The control over common 
affairs has not been relinquished to the bloc because the necessary 
institutional infrastructure has not been constituted.187 The institutional 
weakness of MERCOSUR is what empowers the major members, Brazil and 
Argentina, to impose their own domestic agenda on the bloc if they are in 
182 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 371. 
183 Id. 
184 MERCOSUR R.I.P.?, THE ECONOMIST (July 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21558609/. 
185 The current structure of the MERCOSUR. Its organogram and existing offices within 
the bloc, confirms the members’ understanding of the needs of a strong common market 
agreement. However, the lack of implementation of approved norms and protocols, hinders 
evolution of MERCORSUR towards fulfilling its potential. Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS supra note 15, at 391; Porrata-Doria, supra note 91. 
186 Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 126, at 69-74. 
187 One example is the creation of the Parlasur, which is the common Parliament. The 
members created the Parliament in 2005 and except for Paraguay, the state members have not 
implemented domestically the selection process of their representatives. Such process has 
already been defined by current MERCOSUR regulation. All the regulation is available at 
https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documentos-e-normativa/tratados/. 
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sync or otherwise further disrupt the bloc’s agenda.188 In line with the theory 
presented in this article, such weakness continues to compromise 
MERCOSUR’s success as a freer trade market. Here we see the disadvantage 
of not having a developed country in the bloc. As we discussed above, it was 
the influence of the U.S. that pushed Mexico to implement regulatory reform 
domestically.189 Also, we can see the dominance of Germany and France in 
some areas of the EU, but with a more coordinated agenda.190 
The political character and the strong influence of the members’ 
domestic agendas remain present in the MERCOSUR activities. Only five 
years after being admitted in the bloc, Venezuela was suspended from all 
rights and obligations under MERCOSUR in response to Mr.Maduro’s 
policies that have ruptured the democratic order.191 As the members of 
MERCOSUR experienced, once again, change in government leadership 
moving away from left-wing leaders, the members’ political agenda is 
reflected in the bloc decision to suspend Venezuela.192 I believe that, in spite 
of the most recent political animosity between Brazil and Argentina193 
MERCOSUR may renew its purpose of economic integration, but for the 
bloc to regain the momentum, it will require more than the recent agreement 
signed with the European Union.194 
I believe that the MERCOSUR has become a cautionary tale with 
188 GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS supra note 15, at 388-389. The ascension of 
Venezuela during the Presidency of Mr. da Silva in Brazil, and Mr. Kirchner in Argentina 
confirms this point.  
189 Gillman, supra note 38. 
 190 Here I refrain from making any judgment of the appropriateness of such dominance as 
it has been appointed as one of the possible reasons for the Brexit. My point here is that when 
the supposed dominance is exercised by a developed country, the impact is not as negative as 
seen in the MERCOSUR because there is proper observance of the rule of law and the overall 
goals of the bloc. 
191 MERCOSUR/CMC/ACTA N. 01/17. For access to the full decision on Venezuela’s 
suspension visit the MERCOSUR official website at https://documentos.mercosur.int/ 
public/reuniones/doc/6354. 
 192 Such suspension is more in tune with the purpose of the MERCOSUR, but with strong 
institutions the MERCOSUR would not be so susceptible to the political winds of the region. 
       193 Brazil and Argentina have been quite vocal about their mutual dislike and conflicting 
political agenda. Unfortunately, for the MERCOSUR, they have been using the bloc to 






 194 The free trade agreement between these two blocs was signed in June 2019, after many 
years of slow negotiations. The agreement is not in force yet and it is under scrutiny by EU 
members such as France, which are in clear opposition to many of the policies being 
implemented by the current Brazilian president, Mr. Bolsonaro. The official press release 





lessons on what not to do, guiding present and future regional trade 
integration endeavors. Without a strong domestic commitment to open 
markets from its key members – Brazil and Argentina – the region would 
have benefited more from a less ambitious free trade agreement than the 
regional integration proposed under MERCOSUR. Nonetheless, even a less 
ambitious agreement would have required regulatory reforms to promote 
stable economic growth, as I demonstrate when discussing the positive 
impact of NAFTA above. 
For these reasons, MERCOSUR is neither an instrument that promotes 
domestic governance nor a pro-trade regulatory environment. Therefore, it 
does not promote the inflow of the correct balance of FDI. Although Brazil 
has received high levels of FDI, the country has not been able to promote a 
healthy level of inflow of greenfield FDI, which, according to my theory, is 
one of the reasons for its unstable and unsustainable spurs of economic 
growth. 
6. CONCLUSION
Mexico’s choice of trade liberalization and acceptance of international
law, combined with the conclusion of NAFTA and its concomitant effect, 
have promoted stable, if slow, economic growth. This is due to the resulting 
pro-trade regulatory environment, which has stimulated the inflow of 
greenfield and vertical FDI. Even though Mexico has not implemented all 
the reforms that would promote even greater growth and stability, it opened 
its market and promoted open market policies for the past twenty-five years. 
It is still too early to know how the country will fare under Mr. Lopez 
Obrador’s more populist policies, but if the renegotiations of NAFTA and 
the ratification of the USMCA (the new NAFTA) are any indication, I do 
believe Mexico may continue moving its economic policies in the right 
direction. 
Meanwhile, Brazil’s enforcement of protectionist measures under 
import substitution economic policies and the weakness of MERCOSUR can 
be identified as one of the causes for the country’s sporadic periods of 
economic growth followed by long periods of recession and stagnation. 
Under a more pro-trade administration, Brazil may start moving in the right 
direction.195 
NAFTA was negotiated under the auspices of a strong developed 
country with a very strong private sector, with both the U.S. government and 
the private sector actively promoting the conclusion of the agreement, all 
with the ultimate strong support of another highly developed country, 
Canada. Such strength influenced Mexico’s market opening, complemented 
 195 Brazil’s current Minister of Economics, Mr. Paulo Guedes, and his immediate team are 
graduates from the Chicago School of Economics, and the ones who graduated from other 
programs have published many studies, papers and other research geared toward freer trade 
policies as a more efficient way to promote stable economic growth. 
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by Mexican President Carlos Salinas’ commitment to essentially all the same 
objectives. Meanwhile, MERCOSUR was an overly ambitious project 
negotiated and implemented under very protective market conditions 
strongly influenced by the nationalist policies that were being implemented, 
and to some extent still are, within its member nations.196 The lack of a 
developed country as a member, and without any membership states have a 
sufficiently strong private sector, which would favor rather than oppose freer 
trade, resulted in the MERCOSUR not being a force moving its members 
towards a freer market.197  
The fact that most empirical studies of FDI do not separate data from 
greenfield-FDI to acquisition-FDI,198 and the high level of horizontal FDI 
captured by Brazil, explains why Brazil is reported to receive more FDI than 
Mexico. However, the concentration in acquisition and horizontal FDI does 
not promote the same stable economic growth experienced by Mexico. 
Mexico’s commitment was strengthened under NAFTA and further 
consolidated by the domestic implementation of regulatory changes in favor 
of market deregulation.199 
Brazil has since been diverging even further away from the global trade 
market as it continued to refuse to implement the minimum protection of 
foreign investments such as through the ISDS mechanism and other 
necessary regulatory reform. The inaugural speech of the Brazilian President, 
Mr. Jair Bolsonaro200 indicated the possible emergence of a new era, moving 
away from recent protectionist policies towards the liberalization of trade and 
the reinforcement of contractual obligations and property rights, perhaps 
including protection and attraction of foreign investment.201 However, there 
are so many domestic issues that need to be addressed in Brazil, including 
violence, corruption, and the environment, that the international trade agenda 
196 Paiva & Gazel, supra note 141 at 116; GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra 
note 15 at 391-392. See generally, Carranza, supra note 138. 
    197 Gilman, supra note 38, as the author explains the positive results from USA pressure 
over Mexico during the NAFTA negotiations.  
198 Ferret, supra note 63. 
199 Fingar, supra note 40. 
200 The inaugural speech in Portuguese is available at https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/ 
politica/noticia/2019-01/no-discurso-de-posse-bolsonaro-pede-apoio-para-reconstruir-o-
pais),Mr. Bolsonaro was elected President of Brazil in November 2018, and inaugurated on 
January 1, 2019. President Bolsonaro was elected as the symbol against corruption and with a 
liberal economic agenda.  
201 President Bolsonaro has promised to bring Brazil to the top 50 under the Doing Business 
ranking, and to implement policies towards freer market. Bolsonaro’s inaugural speech, on 
January 1, 2019   and his open speech at the 2019 World Economic Forum Annual meeting, 
emphasized the promises of his presidential campaign (summary available at 
https://www.weforum.org/press/2019/01/we-are-building-a-new-brazil-says-newly-elected-






is not among its first priorities.202 
Mexico has also elected a new President, and as in Brazil, this election 
has great significance as the platform of Mr. Lopez-Obrador is directly 
opposite to that of the former President, Mr. Pena-Nieto.203 Brazil is moving 
away from left-wing policies while Mexico is embracing them. The next few 
years will show whether Mexico’s existing strong commitment to freer 
markets can hold up under the guidance of Mr. Lopez-Obrador, who took 
office December 1, 2018. It is still early to tell, as it is with Brazilian 
President, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro. 
Although this paper identifies how regional trade agreements can 
support developing countries’ economic growth through the promotion of a 
mix of horizontal and vertical investment as well as a balance between 
greenfield and M&A FDI, there are many questions that remain to be 
answered. New governments taking place in Mexico and Brazil will 
undoubtedly offer a great case study for further evaluation of the long-term 
impact of RTAs. Will the USMCA agreement, when it enters into force, 
flourish and continue to bring benefits to Mexico as did NAFTA, even under 
a nationalist/populist government? Many of the necessary reforms are still 
underway in Mexico; how much of this political change will affect Mexico’s 
economic stability and FDI inflow? 
As for Brazil, seeing that MERCOSUR did not have the expected 
impact, and to this day it is not closer to becoming a powerful trade bloc than 
it was twenty-five years ago, we must ask what should happen next with the 
bloc. Should Brazil take the lead once again and exert the necessary pressure 
on its neighbors to move towards the long-expected economic integration? It 
does not seem that either Brazil or Argentina has the necessary strength and 
influence to do so. 
Brazil’s new President has promised to bring the country toward a new 
era of open markets and freer trade. What are the necessary reforms within 
the country that can promote a balanced inflow of FDI, greenfield, and 
acquisition, which will support the country’s growth? Should those reforms 
be coordinated with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay to improve not only 
national but regional economic growth? 
 202 The main focus of this administration has been the reform of the retirement pension 
system, which is the major economic issue in the country. This reform will change the 
structure of the social security system in Brazil. Once the reform is approved the Brazilian 
government is expecting to see an increase in investment and industrial development along 
with financial savings in the order of over $10M per year. 
Hamilton Ferrari & Alessandra Azevedo, Reforma da Previdência deve economizar R$ 1,164 
trilhão em 10 anos, CORREIO BRAZILIENSE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.correio 
braziliense.com.br/app/noticia/economia/2019/02/20/internas_economia,738665/impacto-
da-reforma-em-10-anos-e-de-r-1-164-tri-ministerio-da-economia.shtml. 
      203 For better understanding of Mr. Obrador and his political agenda visit 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Andres-Manuel-Lopez-Obrador.  News coverage of 
Mexican elections in 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44646478. 
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Finally, future empirical studies should measure greenfield and M&A 
FDI inflow to better inform trade policies and necessary regulatory reforms 
that will support developing countries’ stable economic growth. The 
important question is not “Do BITs work?” but how RTAs can support the 
inflow of the right type of FDI that promotes stable economic growth. 
